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1. Introductory Remarks 
This article intends to examine the domestic and foreign policy situation in 
Japan short1y before the outbreak of the Second World War in September 
1939 and to introduce to readers the relevant Japanese documentary sources 
and monographs. In addition， the monographs of European and American 
historians will also be considered when necessary in order to guide readers 
through this complicated fascet of world history. 
This article covers the period between summer 1938 and the end of 1939， 
although from time to time it will be necessary to extend this frame as many of 
Japan's problems which came to a head in 1939 already existed in 1938. In 
those days， Japan suffered great difficu1ties because of the war fought with 
China， which was known in Japan as ‘J apanese-Chinese Incident' or simply as 
the ‘Chinese Incident'. Japan's many failed attempts peacefully to end the war 
will form one of the central subjects of investigation. 
In addition， a number of other problems resulted from the war: 
1) The negotiations for a military alliance with Germany and Italy. These 
negotiations were known in those days in J apan as the ‘Strengthening of the 
Japanese-German-Italian Anti-Comintern Pact'. 
2) The negotiations with England (Arita-Craigie Talks) in 1939 to solve the 
problems resulting from the barricading of the British concessions in Tientsin 
in North China by the Japanese troops. 
3) The worsening of relations with the United States and the resu1ting 
cancellation of the Japanese-American Trade Agreement in July 1939. 
4) The Japanese-Soviet border conflict in Nomonhan (May to September 
1939)， which is not， however， tobe seen as a result of the SinかJapanese War， 
even though it took place at the same time. During this difficu1t situation the 
conclusion of the Hit1er-Stalin Pact had a shock impact on Japan. 
5) The ‘total mobilization' of Japan as a result of the widening of the Sino・
J apanese War. 
These problems， along with the war with China， wil be examined here on 
the basis of existing documentary sources and monographs. 
2. Attempts to End the si.初no小-JapaneseWαar伊'W川it幼h t.幼heHe~伊pof 砂Wan官gChi，加ng-→11吃dei  
On 7 July 1937 a border conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops took 
place at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao) near Peking which developed 
into a war on the Chinese continent. By December 1937 large parts of China 
were under the control of the J apanese Army. Part of the J apanese General 
Staff placed a great deal of hope in the peace mediation which the German Am-
bassador in China， Dr. Oskar Trautmann， carried out between November 1937 
and January 1928.(1) This failed， however， not least because Japan sharpened 
its conditions of peace of 2 November 1937 after the seazure of Nanking， 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's capital (13 December 1937). In addition， 
Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe issued a statement on 16 January 
1938 in which he dec1ared that he would not treat the Nationalist government 
of China headed by Chiang Kai-shek as a partner in the talks.(2) By so doing， 
chances of achieving a negotiated peace were largely eliminated. Against 
Japan's expectations， however， Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek removed his 
capital further inland to Chungking， carrying out his resistance from there. As 
a result Konoe's Cabinet was forced to prove further possibilities in attaining a 
negotiated peace. In May 1938 the Prime Minister replaced Foreign Minister 
kδki Hirota， who was held responsible for the failure of the Trautmann media-
tion， with the retired general Kazushige Ugaki， who had the advantage of main-
taining good contacts with influential Chinese personalities. He immediately 
began negotiations with Kung Hsiang-hsi， the Prime Minister of the Na-
tionalist government. These failed， however， and Ugaki left office on 30 
September 1938. At the same time there were paral1el attempts to influence 
Wang Ching-wei， one of the most important leaders of the Kuomintang (the 
Nationalist Party of China). After Ugaki's failure， circ1es in the Japanese Ar-
my concentrated on this second approach. This led to the so-cal1ed ‘Con-
ference of Chungkuang-t'ang' (a large house in Shanghai)， which ended on 20 
November 1938. 
In order better to understand these ta1ks， itis important to consider the 
memoirs of Colonel Sadaaki Kagesa， who was at that time a section chief at 
the political department of the War Ministry.(3) Kagesa played an important 
role in the overtures towards Wang Ching-wei. In addition， Lieutenant Colonel 
Takeo Imai，(4) and on the Chinese side， the politicians Kao Tung田wuand Mei 
Ssu・p'ingtook part in the conference of Chungkuang-t'ang (12-20 November 
1938). A proposal by Mei and ideas formulated by the Japanese Army， the 
‘Principles on the Regulation of New Sino-Japanese Relations' (Nisshi shin 
kankei chδsei hδshin)， formed the basis for the talks. Kagesa wrote in his 
memoirs， which was written by him at the Japanese military base of Rabaul on 
the Island of Neupommern in the Pacific Ocean during the Pacific War， th
If the J apanese government as well as Wang Ching-wei were to agree to the 
jointly worked out proposals， Wang would immediately fle Chungking. 
As soon as these facts become known in Tokyo， Konoe Cabinet wil issue a 
declaration on the basic principles of SinかJapaneserelations and Wang 
wil respond positively to it. 
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Kagesa wrote further: 
Naturally the course of the discussions in al its phases were conveyed to 
the War Ministry and to the Five Minister Conference， and they approved 
it. 
The final results of the above-mentioned conference were conveyed by 
Imai and myself to the War Minister and to the Vice-Chief of the General 
Staff.紛 Theformer informed the Five Minister Conference and received 
their approval. We also conveyed this information to our Chinese counter-
parts， who agreed with us and the date for Wang's flight was set for 12 
December 1938. According to the agreement of the conference， Konoe 
planned a declaration which was to be issued in Osaka， and he left for 
there. The expected reports of Wang's flight did not， however， arrive in 
time， and so he returned to Tokyo. 
At last we received the information that Wang， somewhat delayed， had 
fted Chungking on 18 December. As is welI-known， Konoe's detailed 
declaration was issued on the radio four days later. 
Wang repo巾 dlater that he made about fourty verbal and written at-
tempts to convince Chiang Kai-shek of the nec田sityof Sino-Japanese 
cooperation. Chiang， however， did not only reject these attempts but， in
addition， even repressed the peace party in Chungking. Instead of continu-
ing his attempts of persuation， he， Wang， came to the conclusion that 
public opinion in China should be mobi1zed rather from the outside， thus 
forcing Chungking to change its course. From Mei Ssu・p'ingwho took 
part in the negotiations in Shanghai， he heard about Japan's new policies 
concerning China and believed it was possible to win over his people if 
Tokyo nurtured such plans. He thus decided to leave Chungking and to 
work for peace from the outside. 
After a ftight which included many dificulties， Wang finally reached 
Hanoi. There he heard the contents of Konoe's radio address and after-
wards released his first declaration， in which he agreed to Konoe's 
remarks. He stressed the importance of friendly relations between the two 
countries and that it was not now necessary to continue hostility， this being 
made obsolte by Konoe's decla.ration of goodwill. In addition， Wang ex-
pressed the hope that the Chungking government would now reconsider its 
position. 
In the Shanghai agreements certain areas were decided on for the sta-
tioning of Japanese troops in Northern China. Under pressure from the 
Japanese Army， however， Konoe only generally addressed himself to the 
fact that his country's military woul 
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Japanese troops. In order to convince these circles ofthe necessity of a set縄
tlement with Japan， a clear announcement on troop withdrawal was a 
must. In a few words， the dilemma lay in the fact that the mentioning of a 
withdrawal had a provocative efect on J apan， on the other hand， however， 
speaking of stationing troops strengthened the Chinese war party.例
As Kagesa's memoirs show， the problem of troop withdrawal was the most 
important issue in the proceedings of the Shanghai Conference (Chungkuang圃
t'ang Conference) and in the talks of the Wang group with Japan. The first arti-
cle in the ‘Shanghai Conference Proceedings' of 20 November 1938 reads: 
Japan and China agree to an Anti-Comintern Pact， which along the lines 
of the treaty between Germany and Italy serves the goal of mutual protec-
tion. In addition， Japan's right to station troops in Inner Mongolia as a 
special zone in order to fight Communism is recognized.ω 
On the other hand Article 6 of the ‘Shanghai Conference Proceedings' 
specified that the Japanese Empire had to withdraw its fighting forces within 
two years. (9) In the first‘additional clause' the stationing of troops in Inner 
Mongolia was limited to the duration of an Anti-Comintern pact which was 
soon to be concluded. Additionally Japan's claim to station troops in Peking 
如 dTientsin， where such privileges were already granted to Japan by the ‘Box-
er Protocol' of 1901， were recognized.(IO) 
A commentary on the course of the negotiations written by Lieutenant幽
Colonel Imai shows that the Chinese participants， Kao and Mei， took the ques帽
tion of troop stationing very seriously and fought vigorously against Japanese 
demands.(1) On 30 November 1938， ten days after the Shanghai protocol was 
signed， the Konoe Cabinet proposed at an ‘Imperial Conference'， aresolution 
on the ‘Principles on the Regulation of New Sino-Japanese Relations'， which 
had been initiated by Kagesa in August 1938. This proposal was agreed upon at 
the ‘Imperial Conference'. This decision， however， differed greatly from the 
‘Shanghai Conference Proceedings'. The former contained a number of 
demands on China. J apan claimed the right of stationing troops not only in 
Northern China and in Inner Mongolia but also in the triangle formed by the 
cities Nanking， Shanghai and Hangchow as well as‘on certain points along the 
Yangtze' and 'on specific islands along the southern Chinese coast'. In addi-
tion China was also to pay a part of the costs of stationing troops in these 
areas.(12) 
This is only one of the many examples of how large the differences were be-
tween the ‘Shanghai Conference Proceedings' and the resolution of the Im-
perial Conference. It is therefore questionable if Wang would have decided to 
fle Chungking had he had a more precise knowledge of the Japanese decision 
of 30 November 1938. It is furthermore doubtful whether Kagesa and lmai had 
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been authorized to hold the ta1ks in Shanghai， which awoke false and op-
timistic expectations on Wang's side. 
In order to understand Japan's position， the fol1owing three dec1arations 
of the Japanese government in 1938 should be compared with each other: 
1) Dec1aration of 16 January 1938: 
Even after the capture of Nanking， the J apanese government have til now 
continued to be patient with a view to affording a final opportunity to the 
Chinese National Government for a reconsideration of their attitude. 
However， the Chinese Government without appreciating the true intention 
of Japan， blindly persist in their opposition against Japan， with no con-
sideration either internally for the people in their miserable plight or exter-
nally for the pcace and tranquility of al East Asia. Accordingly， the 
J apanese Government wil cease from henceforward to deal with that 
Government， and they look forward to the establishment of a new Chinese 
regime， harmonious coordination with which can really be counted upon. 
With such a regime they wil fully co・operatefor the adjustment of Sino・
Japanese relations. and for the building up of a rejuvenated China. 
Needless to state， this involves no change in the policy adopted by the 
Japanese Government of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of China as well as the rights and interests of other Powers in China . . . (13) 
2) Dec1aration of 3 November 1938: 
By the august virtue of His Majesty， our naval and military forces have cap-
tured Canton and the three cities of Wuhan; and al the vital areas of 
China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuomintang Government ex幽
ists no longer except as a mere local regime. However， solong as it persists 
in its anti-Japanese and pro-communist policy our country wi1 not lay 
down its arms -never until that regime is crushed. 
What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which wil ensure 
the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of 
our present military campaign. 
This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual 
aid and co-ordination between Japan， Manchukuo and China in political， 
economic， cu1tural and other fields. Its object is to secure international 
justice， toperfect the joint defence against Communism， and to create new 
culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This 
indeed is the way to contribute toward the establishment of East Asia and 
the progress of the world. 
What J apan desires of China is that that country will share in the task 
of bringing about this new order in East Asia. She confidently expects that 
the people of China will fully comprehend her true intentions and that they 
wil respond to the cal of Japan for their co-operation. Even the participa・
tion of the Kuomintang Governmert would not be rejected， if， repudiating 
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the poIicy which has guided it in the past and remoulding its personnel， so
as to translate its rebirth into fact， it were to come forward to join in the 
establishment of a new order . . (14) 
3) Declaration of 22 December 1938: 
The Japanese Government is resolved， ashas been c1early set forth in its 
two previous statements issued this year， tocarry on the military opera-
tions for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang 
Government， and at the same time to pro偲edwith the work of establishing 
a new order in East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share 
in our ideals and aspirations. 
The spirit of renaissance is now sweeping over al parts of China and en-
thusiasm for reconstruction is mounting ever higher. The Japanese Govern-
ment desires to make public their basic policy for adjusting the relations be-
tween J apan and China， inorder that their intentions may be thoroughly 
understood both at home and abroad. 
Japan， China， and Manchukuo will be united by the common aim of 
establishing the new order on East Asia and of realizing a relationship of 
neighbourly amity， common defence against Communism， and economic 
co-operation. For that purpose it is necessary first of al that China should 
cast aside al narrow and prejudiced views belonging to the past and do 
away with the folly of anti-Japanism， and resentment regarding Man-
chukuo. In other words， Japan frankly desires China to enter of her own 
will into complete diplomatic relations with Manchukuo. 
The existence of the Comintern influence in East Asia can not be 
tolerated. Japan therefore considers it an essential condition of the adjust-
ment of the Sino・Japanese relations that there should be concluded an 
anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with 
the spirit of the Anti Comintern Agreement between Japan， Germany and 
Italy. And in order to ensure the ful accomplishment of her purposes， 
Japan demands， inview of the actual circumstances prevailing in China， 
that Japanese troops be stationed， as an anti-Communist measure， at
specified points during the time the said agreement is in force， and also that 
the Inner Mongolian region be designated as a special anti-Communist 
areas . . (15) 
The reason why the second declaration almost entirely revises the content 
of the first could tie in the fact that the first was heavily criticized abroad as 
well as in Japan itself. Thethird declaration， on the contrary， isto be seen as a 
result of the Shanghai Conference， of the news of Wang's flight from Chungk-
ing to Hanoi and as an attempt to infiuence Wang to support Japan's policies. 
For this reason the tone and contents are conciliatory， as opposed to the 
previous two dec1arations， without， however， being as obliging to the Chinese 
as was the case with the ‘Shanghai Conference Proceedings'. As Kagesa' s 
memoirs show， a date for the withdrawal of troops was not made because of 
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pressure of the J apanese Army. Thus the third declaration by the Konoe 
Cabinet does not include this point although a date was set by the ‘Shanghai 
Conference Proceedings'. The Japanese journalist Shigeharu Matsumoto，(16) 
who， asa mediator， was deeply involved in the ‘Shanghai Conference'， was 
badly shaken by the declaration of 22 December 1938， because it made no men-
tion of troop withdrawals.(17) John H. Boyle came in his study of the history of 
Sino-Japanese War， tothe conclusion that Wang saw his future position in-
creasingly pessimistically while he was in Hanoi. (18) Among other events， the 
resignation of the complete Konoe cabinet at the beginning of January 1939 
must have been a great shock for him.(19) This supposition has much support: 
Baron KiichirδHiranuma， the new Prime Minister and former President of 
the Privy Council， spoke much les conciliatorily of the China problem at the 
above-mentioned Imperial Conference of 30 November 1938 than Konoe did. 
In his typical concealed manner， he appealed for the formation of a govern-
ment in China， which， to outsiders would appear independent， but in fact 
would be entirely controlled by Japan.(20) 
During Wang's stay in Hanoi， the Kuomintang government attempted to 
persuade him not to make his planned trip to J apan and instead to spend a 
long period of time in Europe. (21) It would seem that he considered these sugges-
tions for a while， for he had a former member of his group in the Kuomintang 
bring travel papers and money to him. (2) A few days later， however， one of his 
closest associates was murdered in Hanoi. Either someone wanted to in-
timidate Wang or the assassination was meant for him， and the murder of his 
colleague was a case of mistaken identity. (23) This murder must be seen as an im-
portant cause of Wang's decision not to travel to Europe and to become 
Japan's collaborationist in China. Boyle interprets the events as follows: 
That so much should have hinged on this single event， the death of a rela-
tively unimportant politician， murdered in circumstances that suggest he 
was the victim of a plot gone awry， isa striking illustration of the role of 
chance in history. Beyond that， Wang's dramatic response to the event， his
sudden reversal of plans and decision to plunge wholeheartedly into the 
schemes that only days before had seemed so unpromising， tends to con-
firm Boorman's characterization of him as a “romantic radical"， a man 
whose “ardent patriotism outran his political judgment." In this case， it 
would seem his sense of grief and personal outrage also outran his political 
judgment. (24) 
A1though Boyle's interpretation of the events cannot be disproved， the 
sources do not support it either. It is， inany case， not known for sure if the 
murder was at the bidding of Chiang Kai-shek. It is also not unthinkable that 
there was a secret agreement-or at least a silent understanding-between 
Chiang and Wang on an approach to Japan. The following mysterious cir・
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cumstances hint at such an agreement: Chou Fo・hai，a c10se associate of 
Wang's， was condemned to death by the Kuomintang government in 
November 1945， but the sentence was surprisingly reduced to life imprison-
ment the following March. He died in prison， however， inApril 1946 under 
mysterious circumstances. (25) 
Wang made a serious mistake by fleeing to Hanoi. The original intention 
was that his group was to inflame an armed rebellion against Chiang in the 
Yunnan and Szechwan provinces. The historian Katsumi Usui summarized the 
plan， which already existed before the Shanghai Conference， asfollows: 
The Chinese representatives presented a proposal that surprised and 
delighted the Japanese. As soon as an agreement was reached between the 
two sides， itsuggested， Wang Ching-wei would go to K'unming accom-
panied by Ch'en Kung-po， T'ao Hsi-sheng， and other supporters. Japan 
would then make public the basic terms of the peace agreement and Wang 
would make a public statement of his break with Chiang Kai-shek. Wang 
would thereupon proceed to Hong Kong by way of Hanoi and in Hong 
Kong would announce his assumption of politicalleadership with the aim 
ofbringing about a new order in East Asia. Responding to Wang's cal， the 
Yunnan army would declare the province's independence of Chiang's 
government， a declaration that would be followed by similar action by the 
Szechwan army. Wang had already made pacts with Governor Lung Yun 
of Yunnan and various generals of the Szechwan army， but the revolt 
would have to be initiated in Yunnan because three divisions of the Central 
Army were stationed in Szechwan. Independent administrative units would 
be established in Yunnan and Szechwan， which had not been occupied by 
the Japanese， and following the partial withdrawal of Japanese troops 
from Kwangtung and Kwangsi， those two provinces could serve as the 
basis of a new government. Wang would later organize formally a new 
government embracing Kwangtung， Kwangsi， Yunnan， and Szechwan.(26) 
With regard to this plan Usui made the following comments: 
To the Japanese， this was an epoch欄makingscheme. Despite the capture of 
Wuhan， the struggle in China showed every sign of becoming a protracted 
one. Wang Ching-wei was one of the most eminent leaders of the Kuomin-
tang and well known as a revolutionary. If he gave his prestige in support 
of the peace movement， it might significant1y diminish the Chinese wil to 
resist. Furthermore，明Tangwas promising to start anti-Chiang in-
dependence movements in Szechwan and Yunnan， areas not occupied by 
Japan. Clearly， a regime headed by Wang would have a much stronger 
political base than those of the existing puppet regimes in the occupied 
areas.(27) 
As a result of the fact that Wang was not able to realize this plan， he was 
forced to face the Japanese without any military and territorial power base and 
-8ー
to unconditionally accept the demands of the J apanese. 
The investigation of Wang's activities wil1 be， for the moment， placed into 
the background in order to discuss the policies of the Hiranuma cabinet， which 
was formed on 5 January 1939. 
3. The Hiranuma Cabinet and the Japanese-German Negotiations 
The most important task of the government under Prime Minister 
Hiranuma was to bring the negotiations for a military pact with Germany and 
Italy to a successful conclusion. This plan caused great difficulties in the first 
Konoe Cabinet， and it seems as if it， along with the stil1 continuing war with 
China， was the primary reason for his resignation. 
The alliance question became acute in the summer of 1938， ascan be seen 
in a telegram from the Reich's Foreign Minister， Joachim von Ribbentrop， ad-
dressed to Ambassador Eugen Ott in Tokyo dated 26 April 1939. It included 
the following passages: 
For quite a long time top secret discussions have been taking place between 
Berlin， Rome and Tokyo with a view to conc1uding a defensive alliance 
and， for special reasons and in accordance with arrangements made with 
the other parties， have been conducted outside the usual diplomatic chan-
nels. 
ln the summer of 1938 General Oshima， who was then stil Military At-
tache， gave the information that in the opinion of the Japanese Army the 
time had come to conclude a general defensive alliance between Germany， 
Italyand Japan.(28) 
Mario Toscano and F. C. Jones used this source in order to give support to 
their be!iefs that negotiations had begun around the middle of 1938.(29) Theo 
Sommer criticized these historians， offering the start of 1938 as the beginning 
of the alliance negotiations.(30) He supports his thesis with a statement by 
Oshima at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo， in
which he testified that von Ribbentrop asked him at a New Year's visit at the 
country house in Sonnenburg near Berlin if he saw the possibility of Japan and 
Germany coming closer together either via a treaty or through other means.(31) 
It must be taken into consideration， however， that Oshima， asa defendant， 
used such testimony in his own interest. It would not be altogether proper to 
blindly accept such testimony as proof. Had Oshima named himself as the in・
itiator of the alliance proposal， instead of von Ribbentrop， he ran the risk of 
receiving the death sentence. In fact Oshima himself later repudiated this 
testimony.(32) As opposed to this， von Ribbentrop's telegram， a contemporary 
document， seems to be much more reliable， even though it was written about 
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one and a half years after the negotiations began. Political activities in Tokyo 
also show that the alliance problem became for the first time acute and co距
crete in the summer of 1938 and not in January. It appears also that the in-
itiative lay in J apanese and not in German hands. 
It is generally taken for granted that the cause of the alliance concept on the 
Japanese side lay in the war with China， which was in a quagmire. This view 
was taken， for example， by the American historian Johanna Menzel Meskill， 
who writes: 
Japan's need for a European friend only grew as she acquires new op-
ponents in 1937. Tokyo now hoped that German mediation or German 
pressure would make the Chinese yield to Japan's terms. When this hope 
faded by early 1938， Japan sought an outright military alliance with 
Germany against Russia， by then China's most efective aly. Such an 
alliance， the Japanese hoped， would deter Soviet intervention on behalf 
of China and might even cause the Soviets to abandon their aid to Chiang 
Kai-shek.(33) 
This opinion concurs with the views generally taken by J apanese 
historians， although the documents do not seem to give it ful support and 
o宜erspace for further investigation. 
By a so口ofintrigue， Konoe caused War Minister Hajime Sugiyama， who 
was not cooperative at al to the peace mediation of the German ambassador 
Trautmann， tobe replaced by Seishirδ Itagaki. Konoe expected Itagaki's help 
in the attempt to end the war with China. (34) Itagaki， however， dissapointed the 
expectation of the Prime Minister， and instead introduced to the cabinet on 3 
July 1938 a program， entitled ‘The Army's Hopes Regarding Current Foreign 
Policies' (Jikyoku gaiko ni taisuru rikugun no kibδ). According to this docu-
ment， the goals of Japanese diplomacy had to exist in preventing the USSR 
from entering the conflict with China， inluring England away from its support 
of China， and in influencing the United States to take a neutral position. In 
order to secure Japan's own position， asecret anti-Soviet military alliance with 
Germany should be formed and a similar one with Italy， with the purpose of 
restraining England.(35) The Japanese military， which originally saw an alliance 
with Germany as a method of balancing Russian strength， became convinced 
that England also offered a threat， which should be partially neutralized 
through a pact with Haly. In the Konoe and Hiranuma cabinets of 1938 and 
1939， Itagaki became a main defender of these ideas. During this time， until 
the Tripartite Pact was signed on 27 September 1940， controversies went on 
within the J apanese government. 
As a result of Itagaki's proposals， a負veMinister Conference considered 
the question of such a military alliance and formulated a litle later the ‘Draft 
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Policy for Strengthening Political Ties with Germany and Italy' (Nichi-Doku 
oyobi Nichi-I kan seiji teki kankei kyδka ni kansuru hoshin an)， which includ-
ed the following statement: 
The empire wishes quickly to reach separate agreements with Italy and Ger-
many， making even closer our mutual ties of alliance， and desires to 
strengthen each nation's power to resist the Soviet threat and to check Bri-
tain. By this means we wish to contribute to a speedy and beneficial setle-
ment of the China lncident and to the advancement of our nation's leader-
ship in East Asia. To this end we shal conclude a secret agreement with 
Germany to enlarge the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact to include a 
military al1iance against the Soviet Union and a secret agreement with Italy 
to be used mainly for restraining Britain.(36) 
Thus the military and political leaders of J apan had at first in mind 
separate treaties with Germany and Italy. At the Five Minister Conference on 
12 August 1938， Foreign Minister Ugaki presented a plan which would limit 
the objectives of the proposed treaties to the USSR alone. Opposed to this， 
Itagaki proposed the conclusion of the pact as proposed by the German 
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. The German draft was carried by Major 
General Yukio Kasahara to Tokyo on 5 August. Both von Ribbentrop and 
Itagaki stood for a single agreement between al1 three nations which would not 
be solely oriented against the USSR， but also against England and France. 
Ugaki， however， pointed out the dangers for Japan if she were to become in-
volved in complicated European problems， such as the tension between 
England and Germany over Czechoslovakia. He thus called for caution in 
respect to relations with England.(37) The retired General Ugaki， who replaced 
Hirota as Foreign Minister in May 1938， had exerted strong influence on 
Japanese politics in his past as War Minister. Now he was on the defensive side 
against the younger General Itagaki. 
Navy Minister Yonai and Finance Minister Ikeda supported Ugaki's pru-
dent position. At a Five Minister Conference on 26 August a proposal was 
ratified which foresaw a single treaty between al three powers but which did 
not， however， specify the extent of military support if one of the partners were 
attacked by a country. Because this compromise could be interpreted in 
various ways， long and complicated discussions persisted within the Japanese 
leadership. (38) 
Thus the usually cautious Five Minister Conference accepted the German 
proposa1. This proposal was supported by the J apanese Army， and aimed at 
concluding a single treaty with the European Axis powers instead of separate 
pacts. Because of the unclear formulations of 26 August 1938， there were deep 
differences of opinions within the Konoe Cabinet， which then divided itself 
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into two fronts. On one side was War Minister Itagaki alone， and on the other 
side were Navy Minister Yonai， Finance Minister Ikeda and Hachiro Arita， 
who replaced Ugaki as Foreign Minister in October 1938. This division of 
opinions paralyzed Konoe's Cabinet and was one of the main factors which 
caused Konoe's resignation in January 1939. This split continued， however， in
the following cabinet under Hiranuma. Foreign Minister Arita later wrote in 
his memoirs on these circumstances: 
On 19 January 1939 the Five-Minister-Conference， under the chairmanship 
of the Prime Minister (Hiranuma)， discussed the recently received German 
proposal. Itagaki spoke in favour of them， the other participants rejected 
the alliance in the form proposed by Berlin. After a sharp discussion， the 
following compromise， which 1 proposed， was worked out: 
a) The main objective of the alliance is the Soviet Union， but can include 
under circumstances England and France. 
b) MiItary support to the partners to oppose the Soviet Union is taken 
for granted. But if and to what extent miItary support should be given to 
the partners to oppose England and France depends on the given situation. 
c) As far as the outsiders are concerned， this pact wiI be explained as an 
extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact. 
d) Points b) and c) will be attached to the pact as secret cIauses. 
After this compromise was formulated， Germany， as well as the 
Japanese Army and our Ambassador Oshima (Berlin) and Shiratori 
(Rome) demanded that points b) and c) should be struck out and that a 
miItary alliance without any reservation should be concIuded which would 
equaIIy be directed against England， France and the Soviet Union. 
The decision of the conference of 19 January was made under difficult 
circumstances. In order to explain the difi.culties to Oshima and Shiratori， 
we decided to send a special mission-consisting of one representative each 
from the Foreign Ministry， the Army and the Navy-to Europe. In spite of 
this special measure， both our ambassadors refused to communicate the 
Japanese resolution of 19 January to the German and ltaIian governments 
respectively. At another Five Minister Conference on 13 March 1939， it
was decided that in case Berlin and Rome did not accept the initial pro-
posal of 19 January， points b) and c) would be somewhat revised. 
Oshima and Shir司oribased their opposition to their government on 
the attitude of the Japanese Army， which in turn attempted to use the op-
position of the two ambassadors to cause a change in the decision made in 
January 1939 in favour of an unconditional military pact without any reser-
vation. 
Oshima and Shiratori interpreted the concIusion of the conference of 
13 March such that the Japanese cabinet decided to concIude a treaty at alI 
costs. Thus they did not communicate the resolution of 19 January， but in-
stead they communicated the version of 13 March， thus conceaIing totally 
the poin 
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consideration the reservations on the J apanese side. A new Five Minister 
Conference discussed this proposal on 7 May 1939. The fronts， however， 
remained unchanged: The War Minister spoke in favour of the German 
plan while the other participants opposed it. After that Prime Minister 
Hiranuma urged the leaders of the army and the navy to negotiate the mat幽
ter among themselves， but these discussions did not lead to any results. 
Even at the Five Minister Conference， which took place on 8 August and at 
which the War Minister vigorously demanded the conclusion of the pact， 
no decision was made at al. The War Minister transmitted a verbal note to 
the German ambassador Ott through the chief of the Bureau of Military 
Affairs， Major-General Kazumoto Machijiri， on 1 August 1939. This ver-
bal note suggested Itagaki's planned demission and asked for concessions 
on the German and Italian side. [The main purport of Arita's memoirs].(39) 
Thus Arita's recollections show that the members of the Hiranuma Cabinet 
were not against the pact with Germany and Italy as long as it was directed at 
the Soviet Union only. With the exception of War Minister Itagaki， they oppos-
ed including England and France as targets of the pact. They wanted to avoid 
an armed conflict with England at al1 costs. The danger of a war with the USA 
was not visible at that time. The J apanese government hesitated， not only for 
military reasons， consisting in the fear the Japanese navy had of the British 
Navy， but also for economic reasons， because Japan relied heavily on trade 
with England and the USA. In a report dated 14 March 1939 the German am-
bassador Ott expressed understanding on this point.(40) This problem was 
treated thoroughly by Foreign Minister Arita in a telegram to Oshima in Berlin 
dated 8 April 1939 in which he expressed his opinion as fol1ows: 
The contrasts between Germany and Italy on one side and England and 
France on the other are fatefully conditioned by their geographic condi-
tion. While Japanese differences with Great Britain over China and South 
East Asia cannot be overlooked， the necessity of going to war over them is 
relatively small. Japan's economy is limited by a lack of raw materials. For 
that reason Japan's trade of goods with England and America is of impor-
tance. It is therefore absolutely urgent to avoid antagonism with these 
powers.(41) 
4. The De句pening01 Antagonism toward England and the USA 
Since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 Japanese relations with Great Bri-
tain and the United States had been worsening steadily. They reached a low a 
few years later as a result of the outbreak of the Sino-J apanese War. On 5 Oc-
tober 1937 President Roosevelt sharply criticized the aggressor powers Ger-
manyand Japan， speaking of an epidemic of lawlessness and making them 
responsible for the collapse of law and order on the international scene.(42) In a 
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note to the Japanese Foreign Minister in October 1938， US Ambassador 
Joseph C. Grew protested against Japanese policies， saying that they disposed 
on the Open Door Policy and robbed American citizens of equal chances in 
China.(43) 
One month later England， France and the United States jointly demanded 
the reopening of the Yangtze River for ships， which the Japanese had c10sed 
under the pretext of supposed mi1tary actions.(44) On 30 December 1938 the 
United States rejected the ‘New Order' in China proc1aimed by the Konoe 
Cabinet as falling out of line with the Open Door Policy. (45) A litle later 
England spoke out along the same lines.(46) 
The United States and England gave China a series of credits which allowed 
Chiang Kai-shek's government to survive politically and economically. After 
Konoe's second dec1aration of 3 November 1938 Chiang immediately demand-
ed in the form of almost an ultimatum addressed to the English ambassador 
Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr financial aid from England.(47) A month later Chiang 
received a credit from the Americans for the sum of 25 mi1ion Dollars，(48) and 
in March of the following year a credit from the British for the sum of 10 
mi1ion pounds(49) as well as a further 15 mi1ion Dollar credit from the United 
States. (50) 
In June 1939 the situation became more critical when the Japanese troops 
blockaded the British and French concessions in Tientsin in North China. 
Discussions were carried out a month later in Tokyo between the J apanese 
Foreign Minister Arita and the British ambassador Sir Robert Craigie， which 
were accompanied by strong anti-British agitation in Japan. Craigie relented 
and an initial compromise agreement(51) was made on 22 July， which inc1uded 
the following statement: 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize actual 
situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and note 
that state of afairs continues to exist， the Japanese forces in China have 
special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security 
and maintaining public order in regions under their control and that they 
have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as wil obstruct them or 
benefit their enemy. His Majesty's Government have no intention of 
countenancing any act or measures prejudicial to attainment of the above-
mentioned objects by Japanese forces and they wil take this opportunity 
to con自rmtheir policy in this respect by making it plain to British 
authorities and british nationals in China that they should refrain from 
such acts and measures.(52) 
The interpretation of this agreement led to great differences when Japan in-
terpreted it to their own advantages，(53) which the British disputed.(54) These 
differences suggested the difficulties which would be encountered at the coming 
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talks in Tientsin， which were broken off on 18 August 19391eading to a further 
disintegration of relations between England and Japan. At the same time， 
differences of opinion on the Chinese currency also played a decisive part.(SS) 
Shortly before， on 26 July， relations with the United States took a turn for the 
worse when the USA cancelled the Japanese-American Commercial and 
Navigation Treaty of 1911. 
The question whether the worsening of the relations between J apan on the 
one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other had made war 
inevitable， orin other words， whether there was a direct causal relationship be-
tween the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War， is generally consented to by 
Japanese historians. The historian Yoshii criticizes this assumption in the 
following terms:(S6) 
It is c1ear that the Twenty-one Demands to China in 1915， the Marト
chur泊nAffair in 1931， the Sino・JapaneseWar from 1937 onwards were 
Japan's actions against the Open Door Policy of the United States. A 
decisive factor of Japanese-American antagonism was Japan's unwiIl-
ingness to withdraw her troops from China . . . theSecretary of State Cor-
deI HuII presented a 10 points program to Japan on 26 November， 1941. 
Points 3 and 4 of this ‘HuII Note' called for the evacuation of China and 
French Indochina， and for the support of the Chunking regime and the 
abandonment of the Nanking regime. In spite of Secretary Hull's 'too hard 
and rigid policy' to Japan，(57) we can find another utterance in the Army 
and Government of the United States. For instance，‘Stil1well's Mission to 
China' says as follows:‘The thought behind aid to China was to keep the 
Japanese fuIIy occupied there beginning in the last six months of 1941. '(58) 
And on 7 April1941， Dr. Stanley Hornbeck， the adviser on political rela-
tions in the State Department， hinted as foIIows:‘It is the belief of the 
undersigned that so long as and while Japan remains a member of the 
tripartite alliance， it would not be in the interest of the United States or in 
the interest of Great Britain that the J apanese-Chinese hostilities be 
brought to an end by any process which leaves Japan's military machine 
undefeated (undiscredited) and intact . . . Theworld situation being what 
it is， the world conflict and its problems being what they are， Japan's pre-
sent involvement in China is to the advantage of the United States and 
Great Britain . . (59) 1 think these thoughts are inconsistent with Secretary 
Hull's‘moralistic and legalistic approach'(60) to Japan. Therefore I cannot 
recognize that the China problem is the most serious matter in the confron-
tation between Japan and the United States . . . TheSoutheast Asian ques-
tion is more important than the China problem as a cause of the Japanese-
American war. Both Japan and the United States had a vital interest in 
Southeast Asia. While Japan hoped to get oil， the United States also ex-
pected to get such natural resources as gum and tin from Southeast Asia. 
On 17 April， 1940， indefining this interest， Secreatary Hull made a state-
ment about the American dependence on the Netherlands Indies for such 
essential commodities as rubber， tin， quinine， copra， etc.(61) These 
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economic interests were a matter of serious strategic concern in the United 
States. It had been calculated by the army and navy that if the Japanese 
seized control of the Dutch East Indies， this would involve 90% of the 
American supply of rubber and tin.(62) 
5. The Activities 01砂'angChing-wei 
As a1ready mentioned， Wang Ching-wei gave up his plans for a longer stay 
in Europe ear1y in 1939. Instead he made for Shanghai， where he arrived on 8 
May， taking up residence in the French colony. His following political ac-
tivities were later summed up by Chiang Kai-shek as follows: 
Wang attempted in vain to keep his future government independent of 
Japanese pressure. These goals， however， went against the politicalline in 
Tokyo and were crushed at the Five-Minister-Conference of 6 June. Wang 
travelled to Japan at this time in order to win the support of leading 
statesmen. He had talks with Prime Minister Hiranuma， Foreign Minister 
Arita， War Minister Itagaki and with Konoe， President of the Privy Coun-
cil. Until then Wang could not possibly have guessed the Japanese reac-
tions. On 15 July he presented the following program， entitled ‘Expecta-
tions for the Japanes巴Governmentin Respect to the Principle of Chinese 
Sovereignty' at his second meeting with Itagaki. It included， among others， 
the following points: 
1. The future Chinese government wil not serve any Japanese consultant 
in order to prevent the impression that J apan has intervened with internal 
Chinese matters. Bilateral negotiations will be carried on normal 
diplomatic levels. 
2. As the highest organ of the Chinese army， a consultation commission 
will be set up which will include， aside from J apanese representatives， Ger-
mans and Italians. 
3. Public and private property confiscated by the Japanese during the oc-
cupation wil be immediately returned. 
Wang's proposals went against Japanese principles， and he therefore 
did not even receive an answer. He left， trying to win the support of 
regional Chinese rulers in Tientsin and Shanghai， without any success.(63) 
Wang made many politica1 errors at this time， the causes of which lay in the 
fact that he had a fa1se idea of the intentions of the J apanese government. He 
did not rea1ize that Tokyo planned， atthe most， a marionette role for him. In 
this respect， Chiang Kai-shek's analysis of the situation was correct. The in-
fluence of people like Kagesa and Imai， who awoke these false impressions in 
Wang， cannot be over1ooked. These men showed understanding for Chinese 
national feelings， but they were the exception rather than the rule among 
Japanese military and politicalleaders. Wang's impressions did not change in 
his trip to Tokyo during May and June 1939. One of his travel companions 
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noted that he， Wang， saw Japanese politics in an al too positive light and that 
he was unnecessari1y polite.剛 Wangreceived his first hard setback on 1 
November 1939 in Shanghai at the beginning of talks with Japan.c6S) Through 
his sheer compliancy， a ‘Negotiations Protocol on the Reglementation of 
Japanese-Chinese Relations' was completed on 30 December. The historian 
Katsumi Usui believed that with this document， Wang's peace efforts lost al 
meaning.(66) The content ofthe protocol was very close to that ofthe resolution 
of the Imperial Conference of 30 November 1938. Wang was probably 
disillusioned and shocked by this time. Two of his followers， among them Kao 
Tung-wu， left him， and secretly withdraw from Shanghai to Hong Kong， 
where they released to the Chinese press the contents of Japan's demands.(67) 
At the time Wang left Chungking he did not intend for sure to form a new 
government. Prime Minister Konoe also did not have any such expectation， 
but rather， according to his then Cabinet Secretary had the following idea: 
It is a fact that Konoe never considered， never even dreamed， of 
establishing a new central government centered on Wang at this time 
(December 1938) . . . Konoe earnestly hoped that， with Wang standing in 
between， acting as mediator， (Japan) might be able to ta1k with China and 
things might proceed beter. That is al he hoped for. There was no reason 
for a Wang regime or anything like that. Moreover， inview of the (lack of) 
progress of the new regimes in North and Centra1 China， ta1ks of another 
new regime was something that could have had litle appeal (to Konoe).(68) 
Wang wrote in his political testament， first published in 1964， twenty years 
after his death: 
The real cause for my flight from Chungking， was that 1 wanted the 
Japanese government to think over the possibility of a peace settlement by 
taking a demonstrative oppositional stand against Chiang.側
However， based on ImaPs report(70) and Kagesa's memoirs(71) on the 
‘Shanghai Conference' ， it becomes app町entthat Wang， ata very early ph回e，
considered setting up his own power base in the form of a government in op-
position. Boyle attempted to reconcile these differences by stating that Wang 
took two possibilities into consideration at the same time: a negotiated peace 
or the setting up of a pro-J apanese government. (72) One can also guess that 
Wang thought of forming his own government after leaving Shanghai for 
Japan.(73) 
6. The Nomonhan lncident and the Hitler-Stalin Pact 
During the middle of 1938 the Japanese army came to the conclusion that 
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the war with China had reached a stage in which a long duration was in-
evitable. For that reason they decided to transport a part of their forces station-
ing in China to Manchuria in order to build up their position against the Soviet 
Union. From the autumn of 1938 until well into 1939， the Japanese General 
Staff in Tokyo carried out investigations under the name ‘Operation Plan No. 
8'. This plan concerned the build up of the Japanese mi1tary power over a 
period of five years in response to the Soviet threat. Until then it had been 
taken for granted that the main theatre of an armed conflict with the Soviet 
Union would be east of Manchuria in the Soviet coastal province. The incident 
in Changkufeng in July and August of 1938 showed that the Soviets were praひ
tically untouchable there. That is why the Japanese General Staff then corト
sidered the zone between Manchuria， Outer Mongolia， and the Soviet Union 
as the most probable centre of the conflict. It was with this border area that the 
investigations of ‘Operation Plan No. 8' were concerned.(74) 
In the summer of 1938 Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara， known 
as an expert on the USSR， was named commander of the 23rd Division， which 
was stationed in Manchuria near this area. He was not supposed to provoke a 
border incident， but rather to devote himself to the study of ‘Operation Plan 
No. 8' .(75) 
A skirmish which took place on 12 May 1939 developed， however， into a 
local Russo-Japanese war. Without going into its details， it should be mention-
ed that this conflict and the negotiations going on with the British in Tokyo at 
the same time influenced each other. In the operations department of the K wan-
tung Army itself there existed various opinions. One point of view considered 
that a war with the Soviet Union should be avoided because atthe present time 
negotiations between Arita and Craigie were developing favourably for the 
J apanese. Proponents of a harder line proposed the use of force against the 
Soviet Union because they felt it was the only way to impress England. The 
later opinion， with its fatal implications， was accepted.(76) 
The historian Y oshii believes that the standstill of the negotiations on a 
tripartite pact with Germany and Italy and the negotiations in progress with 
Craigie were responsible for the fact that the leaders of the J apanese army in 
Tokyo did not forbid the military action of the Kwantung Army against the 
Soviet Union.(77) 
The so-called ‘Nomo 
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navy were in agreement that bold po1icies， such as the conc1usion of a non-ag-
gression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union， had to be undertaken.(79) 
The completion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact was a great shock to J apan. It was 
made public at the same time with the defeat at Nomonhan， increasing the feel-
ing of terror on the Japanese side.(80) Unti1 this point of time the Japanese con-
stantly felt that the Soviet Union had to be the central objective of a coming 
pact with Germany and Italy. Unti1 then the tug-of-war over the question 
whether England and France would also be considered as the potential enemies 
of the pact or not delayed the negotiation on this pact. Now Berlin signed a 
Non-Aggression Pact with Moscow， the assumed main potential enemy. In 
helplessness， the Hiranuma cabinet resigned. The following commentary ap-
peared in the press: 
Until now the Hiranuma cabinet has been staking its existence on sup-
porting the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern axis. Now Germany has 
signed a pact with the USSR and promised not to enter into any anti-Soviet 
treaty. This means that Japan's former negotiation partner has suddenly 
disappeared from the picture.(81) 
In an interview， Hiranuma explained the reason of his resignation by 
stating that ‘with the conc1usion of the Hitler同StalinPact， a complicated， 
mysterious situation emerged in Europe'. (82) This quotation of a J apanese 
Prime Minister leaving office on the ‘complicated， mysterious situation' 
became a phrase on everybody's lips in Japan. 
7. The New Orientation of the Abe Cabinet 
After Hiranuma's resignation， the retired general Nobuyuki Abe formed a 
new cabinet on 30 August 1939. In a cabinet statement of 4 September he stress-
ed that J apan did not intend on getting involved in the war in Europe but 
rather to devote itself to the settlement of the conflict in China. After that， the 
troops taking part in the fighting on the Chinese Continent were unified and 
placed under the command of General Toshizo Nishio. The former War 
Minister Itagaki was made his Chief of Staff. With this move the General Staff 
intended to strengthen control of the troops in the field through a central point 
in Tokyo and to coordinate the numerous peace initiatives.(83) 
Abe's cabinet demanded that the powers involved in the war in Europe 
remove their troops from the Chinese territories occupied by Japan. On 13 
November the British informed the Tokyo government of their intention to 
withdraw their 1000 soldiers， stationed there on the basis of a contract signed 
in 1901; France followed this move shortly after.(84) 
Unti1 then the war in Europe had only positive aspects for Japan. The prob-
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lem now lay in attaining a sett1ement with the United States， which sti1 con-
tinued to support Chiang. The new Foreign Minister， retired admiral 
Kichisaburo Nomura， was critical of Japanese policy and sought a new under-
standing with the United States and England. He also saw the necessity of win-
ning American and British investment for the J apanese occupied area of 
China. He thus undertook discussions with the American Ambassador Joseph 
C. Grew and made the conci1atory gesture of opening the Yangtse between the 
Delta and Nanking for international shipping. However， American friendship 
was not to be bought for such a cheap price. Thus the Japanese-American 
Commercial and Navigation Treaty expired on 26 January 1940 after a six 
month period of notice.(85) The Abe cabinet fai1ed in its attempts to formulate 
a new foreign policy and resigned the same month.(86) 
8. The Development 01 Total Mobilization'加 Japan
At this point it is necessary to briefly examine changes in Japan's infra-
structure during 1939. After the end of the First Wor1d War voices within the 
mi1tary had been calling for a system of total mobi1zation based on the Ger-
man mode1. The Sino-Japanese War pushed to the realization of this idea， 
which found expression in two laws: The 'Law on National Mobi1zation' (5 
May 1938) and the 'Law on the State Control of Electricity'， which gradually 
came into effect between May 1938 and March 1939.(87) Thus in quick succes-
sion a number of war oriented measures were introduced， which inc1uded price 
and salary controls， frozen to their level of September 1939.(8) 
Because of the expansion of the war with China mi1tary spending and 
accordingly the entire budget was great1y increased. Government bonds 
were issued. However， only 85% were taken up by banks etc. Thus inflation 
grew.(89) 
The following tables should make c1ear Japan's financial situation and the 
mobi1zation of its fighting forces. 
These talbes make c1ear the growing mibi1zation in the mi1tary and 
economic spheres. At the end of 1939 a five-part radio series was broadcast 
about Ludendorff's conception of ‘total war'， which can be seen as symp-
tomatic for the time.(92) Ludendorff opposed Clausewitz's theory that the 
mi1tary must take second place to the primacy of politics， and Ludendorff's 
theory found support in the series.(93) This tendency was already at hand in 
Japan since the Meiji Era and the ‘independence of the prerogative of the 
supreme command' supported it. But the war with China strengthened essen-
tialy this tendency. Because the independence from the civi1an control of the 
prerogative of supreme command of the Japanese emperor had been establish欄
ed well before the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889， tendency 
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Tabel 1: Growth of military expenses and government bonds(90) 
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toward the primacy of the military over the civilian authority potentially ex-
isted since then in Japan.(94) 
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9. Closing remarks 
The previous remarks have portrayed Japan at the time the Second World 
War broke out. Eberhard Jackel formed the following questions in this regard: 
The attempt to present a unified portrayal of the European-Atlantic War 
and the War in the Pacific has not yet been successfu1. One speaks， 
understandably， ofthe Second World War， but from the history books one 
gains the impression that two wars went on simultaneously， one in the east 
and one in the west . . . Wasit not perhaps coincidence that at roughly the 
same time in Europe and the Far East conflicts broke out for different 
reasons， which brought the partners into a constellation that made it ap-
pear that it was just a single war? What connects the theatres of war and 
the different nations to each other? Where is the cohesion of the War to be 
found?(95) 
Based on my investigation above， Jackel's questions can only be partially 
answered becauseー itmust be stressed-historians have not yet completely 
solved many problems. 
The Chinese lncident had a special character in that it went on for eight 
years without ever being an officially declared war. The ambassadors of the 
warring nations were sti1l at their post a half a year after fighting began. 
Almost immediately inexaustible peace negotiations went out from both sides， 
which continued throughout the following years.(96) We do not know exactly 
how many attempts there were to create a direct contact between Chiang Kai-
shek and Japan. Proven as establishing a direct contact can only be the at-
tempts by the German Ambassador Trautmann. The failure of this initiative 
had a negative effect on Japan. The attempts to achieve a setIement with 
Wangdi協同dfrom other initiatives because it involved the setting up of an op-
position government. 
Chiang's regime received military and financial support not only from the 
USSR， which was especia11y active at the beginning，(97) but also from the 
United States and England. The USA and Great Britain supplied credits and 
delivered， via the Burma Route， arms and supplies. Throughout the long dura-
tion of the war the difference between J apan on one hand and England and the 
USA on the other grew. Great Britain's policies showed a certain flexibi1ity 
through their own weakness， such as can be seen in the above mentioned 
Craigie-Arita agreement of July 1939. On the other hand the United States was 
far less yielding， basing their policies firmly on the ‘Open Door' Doctrine， 
which was formulated in 1899 by the then Secretary of State John Hay.(98) ln 
spite of its intentions being not wholly clear in its initial phase， the Open Door 
Policy became increasingly firmer as the basis of the American China policy. It 
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was consisted of the three principles: The ‘Open Door' of the Chinese market， 
the equality of the commercial opportunity in China， and the territorial and ad-
ministrative integrity of China. Until 1941 the United States continued to de-
mand from Japan the recognition of these principles. These demands were in-
cluded in Nine-Power Treaty of 1922， Stimson Doctrine of 1932， and fina11y in 
the Hull Note of 1941. These principles were violated a number oftimes， for ex-
ample with the ‘Manchurian Incident' of 1931， and even more so， with the 
start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. It cannot， however， be answered for 
certain whether these events made war between Japan and the United States in-
evitable. It was the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor， and not the Sino・
Japanese War which caused the United States to enter World War 1. The out-
break of hosti1ties in Europe in September 1939 did not make Japan's entry 
into the World War inevitable either. 
The outbreak of war in Europe did not provide Chiang with an ideal situa-
tion either， asEngland found herself forced to withdraw from China. The 
strong possibility that Japan could form an alliance with Germany and with 
the USSR was not to Chiang's liking.(9) The realization of this idea became a 
strong possibility when Tokyo entered into its pact with Berlin and Rome， a 
pact in which the inclusion of Moscow was foreseen.(!OO)‘Operation Bar-
barossa' made this plan， however， obsolete. In spite of the German pressure， 
Japan was able to avoid entering into a war against the Soviet Union. But in 
Japan an order was released in July 1941 on the preparation of an attack on 
the USSR titled the ‘Specia1 Manoeuvres of the Kwantung Army' .(101) For 
various reasons， the explanation of which go beyond the scope of this articIe， 
armed hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union did not come to a head 
until1945. 
The question whether the China Incident made the War in the Pacific in-
evitable-a question impossible to answer for certain-poses a second prob・
lem: Did Chiang， before December 1941， consider the expansion of hostilities 
between Japan and the USA to a ful war unavoidable or not? The question 
must also be asked whether Chiang rejected peace initiatives because of the 
harsh conditions of J apan or because he counted on a war between J apan and 
the USA， this being his only chance for a victory. If Chiang re叫lythought in 
this way， we must ask when he came to this conclusion. Onl 
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impetus behind his policies.(102) 
The impossibi1ty of bringing the war with China to a quick and victorious 
end brought about Japan's strategy of tempting Wang to leave Chungking. 
His presence， however， brought about in turn difficulties in achieving an ear1y 
set1ement of the conflict. Yosuke Matsuoka， the Foreign Minister in Konoe's 
second cabinet (22 July 1940-16 July 1941)， attempted anew to launch a peace 
initiative with the help of a Chinese mediator in september 1940. At almost the 
same time the Imperial Conference of 13 October decided， on the one hand， to
try to negotiate directly with Chiang， and on the other hand， resolved to sign a 
pact recognizing a government led by Wang by the end of November of the 
same year ar the very latest. Under pressure from many corners， Matsuoka was 
forced to give up his attempts， and to sign the pact with Wang. This two-sided， 
contradictory policy reflects Japan's di1emma and the internal division within 
the J apanese leadership. (103) 
NOTES 
(1) On Trautmann's mediatory efforts se: Yu-Hsi Nieh， Die Entwicklung des 
chinesischてjapanischenKonfliktes in Nordchina und die deutschen Vermit-
tlungsbemuhungen 1937-1938， Hamburg 1970; Masaki Miyake， Nichi-Doku・I
sangoku d，δmei no kenkya (A Study on the Tripartite Alliance Berlin-Rome-
Tokyo)， Tokyo 1975， Chap. 2， Trautmann kosaku no seikaku to shiryo (The 
nature and record of Trautmann's peace mediation). 
(2) The Japanese government declared， inaddition， that the ‘rejection as a partner 
of talks' was stronger than the ‘norトrecognition'of the Chinese Nationalist 
Government， and was intended to disavow and liquidate it. Cf. John Hunter 
Boyle， China and Japan at War， 1937-1945: The Politics 01 Collaboration， 
Stanford 1972， p.81. This article owes much to this excellent study based 
among others on the J apanese source material. 
(3) Sadaaki Kagesa wrote in 1943-in the meantime becoming a Lieutenant 
General-under the title Sozoro gaki (Wandering Memoirs) his recollections of 
the war with China and his role as a mediator between the Japanese military 
and Wang Ching-wei. They are contained in: Katsumi Usui (edふGendaishi 
shiryo (Documents on Contemporary History)， vol. 13， Tokyo 1966， pp. 349-
398. On the conditions concerning the source material of the contemporary 
history of Japan， cf.Masaki Miyake，‘Die Achse Berlin-Rom-Tokio im Spiegel 
der japanischen Quellen'， in:Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs， 
21. Band， 1968， Wien. 
(4) Takeo Imai belonged， asa Lieutenant Colonel to the China Group within the 
China section of the Second Department (Information) of the General Staff. 
Next to Kagesa， he was one of the main figures involved in the political 
manoeuvreing around Wang Ching-wei， and in 1943 he was promoted to the 
rank of Major General. His memoirs are an important source of information: 
-24-
Takeo Imai， Shina jihen no kaisδ(Recollections of the China Incident)， Tokyo 
1964. 
(5) Reported by Kagesa， op. cit.， p.360f. 
(6) Lieutenant General Hayao Tada strongly supported Trautmann's mediation. 
On Tada， cf. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann， Der Ferne Osten (dtv-
Weltgeschichte， 6)， Munich 1970， pp. 387-389. 
(7) Kagesa， op. cit.， p.36lf. 
(8) On the progress of the conference， se: Ken Inukai， Yosu-ko wa imamo 
nagarete iru (The Yangtse Sti1l Flows)， Tokyo 1960， p.87. 
(9) Gaimusho (Japanese Foreign Ministry) (ed.)， Nihon gaiko nenpyδnarabini 
shuyδ bunsho 1840・1945(Chronological Tables and Important Documents on 
the Japanese Foreign Policy)， vo1. 2， Tokyo 1966， p.402. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Ibid.， p.403. 
(12) Ibid.， p.406. 
(13) English translation in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 01 the United 
States， Japan: 1931幽・1941，vol. 1， Washington D.C. 1943， p.437 (henceforth 
quoted as: FRUS). (In quoting these English version (Note 13， 14， 15)， a 
minimum revision is added by the author.) 
(14) Ibid.， p.478. 
(15) Ibid.， p.482f. 
(16) Matsumoto was unti1 the end of 1938 head of the Shanghai ofice of ‘Domei-
Tsushin-Sha'， one of the lafgest Japanese press agencies. 
(17) Shigeharu Matsumoto， Shanghai jidai. Jonar加ltono kaisδ(My Days in 
Shanghai. Recollections of a Journalist)， vo1. 3， Tokyo 1975， p.315. 
(18) Boyle， op. cit.， p.227. 
(19) Ibid. 
(20) Kazuo Horiba， Shina jihen senso shido shi (History of the Strategy of the 
China Incident)， Tokyo 1973 (Reprint of the origina1 edition 1962)， p.225. 
(21) Boyle， op. cit.， p.228. 
(22) Ibid. See a1so: Kimitada Miwa， 'The Wang-Ching-wei Regime and Japanese 
Efforts to Terminate the China Conflict'， in:Joseph Roggendorf (ed.)， Studies 
in Japane，宮eCulture， Tokyo 1960， p.130. 
(23) Boyle， op. cit.， p.228f. 
(24) Ibid.， p.230. The work quoted therein is Howard L. Boorman， 'Wang Ching-
wei: A Political Profile'， in:Hsueh Chun-tu (ed.)， Revolutionary Leaders in 
Modern China， New York 1971， pp. 295-319. 
(25) Koichi Masui， Kankan saiban shi 1946-1948 (History of the Trials of the pro-
Japanese collaborationists of China)， Tokyo 1977， pp. 246-249. See a1so: Lin 
Han-sheng，‘Chou Fo-hai. The Diplomacy of Surviva1'， in: Richard D. Burns 
and Edward M. Bennet (edsよDiplomats加 Crisis.United States-Chinese-
Japanese Relations 1919山 1941，Santa Barbara 1974， pp. 171-193. 
(26) Katsumi Usui，‘Nitchu sensδno seijiteki tenkai， 1937nen-1941nen' ( 
-25ー
Tokyo 1963， p.202 (henceforth quoted as: TSM).; Katsumi Usui，‘The Politics 
ofWar'， in:James Wi1liam Morley (edふTheChina Quagmire:・Japan's Expaか
sion on the Asian Continent 1933-1941， Selected translations from Taiheiyo 
sensδe no michi: kaisen gaikδshi (Japan's Road to the Pacific War: A 
Diplomatic History of the Origins of the War)， New York 1983， p.382. 
(27) TSM， vol. 4， p.202f. Morley， ibid. 
(28) Akten zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik (henceforth quoted as: ADAP)， 
Series D， vol. VI， No. 270. Oshima was named ambassador to Berlin in Oc-
tober 1938. The English translation as shown in: Documents on German 
Foreign Policy， 1918-1945. Series D， Washington D.C.， vol. VI. 
(29) Mario Toscano， The Origins ojthe Pact oj Steel， Baltimore 1967， p.5f.; F. C. 
Jones， Japan's New Order in Asia. Its Rise and Fa1l1937-1945， London 1954， 
p.102. 
(30) Theo Sommer， Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Machten 1935-1940. 
Vom Antikominternpakt zum Dreimachtepakt. Eine Studie zur 
diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs， Tubingen 1962， p.102. 
(31) Oshima's testimony in: International Milita.η Tribunal jor the Far East 
(IMTFE)， Record of Proceedings， p.6051 (unpublished). Published in Japa-
nese as幻'okutokokusai gunji saiban sokki roku (Stenographic Records of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East)， vol. 2， Tokyo 1968， p.197. 
(32) Interview with Oshima on 23 November 1973. At that time the author promised 
to Oshima not to make use of these remarks by him during his lifetime. He died 
on 6 June 1975. 
(33) Johanna Menzel Meskill， Hitler & Japan. the Hollow Alliance， New York 
1966， p.8. Tomoyoshi Hirai， professor of international politics at Osaka City 
University， reports on the Soviet help for Nationalist China in his essay‘Soren 
no doko 1933nen-1939nen (The Activities of the Soviet Union 1933-1939)， in:
TSM， vol. 4， p.259ff. Shortly after the conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese Non-
Aggression Pact of21 August 1937， the Soviet Union is reported to have provid-
ed Nationalist China with 350 or 400 airplanes and a short-term credit (FRUS， 
1937，vo1.3，pp.616-618組 d639f.; Hirai， op. cit.， p.318). Soviet advisors and 
volunteer pilots started coming to China in the autumn of 1937 (Hirai， op. cit.， 
p. 324). In 1938 Moscow was very generous and delivered to China a Iarge 
amount of materiaI aid via Alma-Ata-Sinkiang and， probably， via Hong Kong 
and Indochina (FRUS， 1938， vol. 3， p.135f.; Hirai， op. 
-26ー
tinent)j in: Kokuゾδhδ(AirReview)， April1978. Cf. also Kindermann， op. cit.， 
p.395. 
(34) Akira K田ami，Konoe naikaku (Konoe's Cabinet)， Tokyo 1951， pp. 111-119. 
(35) James W. Morley (ed.)， Deterrent Diplomacy. Japan， Germany， and the USSR 
1935-1940. Selected translations from Taiheiyδsensσe no michi: kaisen gaikδ 
shi， New York 1976， pp. 268-270 (Appandix 3). 
(36) Tokushiro Ohata，‘Nichi-Doku bokyo kyotei: do kyoka mondai' (The Anti-
Comintern Pact and the Problem of the Strengthening of the Pact)， in:TSM， 
vol. 5， Tokyo 1968， p.67.; Tokushiro Ohata，‘The Anti-Comintern Pact 1935-
1939'， in:Morley， op. cit.， p.55. The participants of the Five-Minister-Con-
ference included， aside from the Prime Minister， the Foreign Minister， the W釘
Minister， the Navy Minister and the Finance Minister. The Five Minister Con-
ference was initiated by the Prime Minister Konoe as a sort of “inner cabinet" 
on 10 June 1938. The system of the Five-Minister-Conference existed since the 
SaitδCabinet (1932-1934). Cf. Ikuhiko Hata，‘Nitchu senso no gunjiteki 
tenkai'ぐfheMilitary Development of the Sino-Japanese War)， in: TSM， vol. 
4， p.154f. 
(37) Ohata， op. cit.， pp. 68-70.; Morley， op. cit.， pp. 57-59. 
(38) Ohata， ibid.， p.75.; Morley， ibid.， p.61. 
(σ39町) Ab勧ri凶dg伊edfrom: Ha配chi討r泊δArit同a，Hiμto no me no chi1かriバ伊ぜ 0 mηziかr同札.
kαiko roku (Seeing the Splinter in the Eye of the Other. Recollections of 
Foreign Policy Problems)， Tokyo 1948， pp. 13-23. 
(40) ADAP， Series D， vol. 4， No. 549. 
(41) Summarized from: Jun Tsunoda (ed.)， Gendai shi shiryδ(Documents on Con-
temporary History)， vol. 10， Tokyo 1963， p.25lf. On the development of Ger-
man-Japanese relations in this period， see Gerhard Krebs， Japans Deutschland-
politik 1935-1941. Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Pazifischen Krieges， 2 
Bde.， MOAG Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft fur Natur-und Volkerkunde Osta-
siens e.V.， Band 91 (Hamburg， 1984). This detailed study fully utilizes many 
documentary sources and monographs in the Japanese language together with 
sources and monographs in the European languages. 
(42) For Roosevelt'ピQuarantineSpeech'， cf.Gerd Ressing， V訟'rsagteder Westen in 
Jalta und Potsdam?， Frankfurt am Main 1970， p.llf. On the origins of this 
type of‘epidemiological' thinking on the part of the American leaders is exam-
ined by Yδnosuke Nagai，‘The Roots of Cold War Doctrine: The Esoteric and 
the Exoteric'， in: Y 
-27ー
Japanese History)， vo1. 20， Tokyo 1976， p.164. 
(47) Johnson (Chungking) to the Secretary of State， No. 547， 16November 1938， as
quoted in Boyle， op. cit.， p.222. 
(48) FRUS， The Far East， 1938， vol. 3， p.586f.， The Acting Secretary of State to 
the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)， 15December 1938. 
(49) DBFP， 1939， vol. 3， No. 528， Viscount Halifax to Sir A. Clark-Kerr (Shanghai)， 
3 March 1939; FRUS， The Far East， 1939， vo1. 3， p.657， The Charge in China 
(Peck) to the Secretary of State， 10 March 1939. 
(50) FRUS， The Far East， 1939， vol. 3， pp. 653-655， The British Embassy 
(Washington) to the Department of State， 7 March 1939. 
(51) Usui， TSM， vo1. 4， p.180f.; Morley， The China Quagmire . . ， p. 360. 
(52) DBFP， 1939， vo1. 9， No. 353， Sir Robert Craigie to Viscount Halifax， 21July 
1939. 
(53) Usui， TSM， vol. 4， pp. 182-184.; MorIey， op. cit.， p.361-363. 
(54) DBFP， 1939， vol. 9， No. 361， Sir Robert Craigie to Viscount Halifax. 
(55) Ibid.， No. 550， Sir Robert Craigie to Viscount Halifax， 18August 1939; Usui， 
TSM， vo1. 4， p.184.; Morley， op. cit.， p.363f. On the Arita，・Craigietalks， see 
in addition: Bradford A. Lee， Britain and the Sino・JapaneseWar 1937-1939， 
Stanford 1973， Chapter VII (The Crisis at Tientsin). 
(56) Hiroshi Yoshii，‘The Direct Causes of the Pacific War Particularly Centering 
on the Studies of the United States-Soviet Rapprochement after the Outbreak 
of the German-Soviet War and Japan's Southward Advance'， Paper read at 
the International Milita，砂 HistoryColloquy， Ottawa， 25 August 1978. 
(57) Paul W. Schroeder， The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941， 
Ithaca， New York 1958， p.203. 
(58) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland， United States Army in World War 
1. China-Burma-India Theater， Stilwel's Mission to China， Office of the 
Chief of Military History， Department of the Army， Washington D.C.， 1953， 
p. 12， asquoted in Yoshii， op. cit.， p.3. 
(59) FRUS， The Far East， 1941， vol. 4， p.124f. 
(60) George F. Kennan， American Diplomacy 1900-1950， New York 1951， p.93. 
(61) FRUS， Japan H， p.281f. 
(62) United States Army in World War II， The War D句partment，vo1. 4， part 1， 
Mark Skinner Watson， Chief of Staff， Prewar Plans and Preparations， Office 
of the Chief of Military History， Department of the Army， Washington D.C.， 
1950， p.80， asquoted in Yoshii， op. cit.， p.5. A causal relationship between 
the Sino-Japanese War (the China Incident) and the War in the Pacific is also 
negated in: Akira Iriye， Nichi-B， 
-28ー
(65) Katsumi Usui， Nitchu senslδ(The Sino・JapaneseWar)， Tokyo 1967， p.99f. 
(66) Ibid.， p.100. 
(67) Ibid.， p.100f. 
(68) Kazami， op. cit.， p.178.; English translation as quoted in Boyle， op. cit.， p.
220. 
(69) Masui， op. cit.， p.322. 
(70) Gaimusho， Nihon gaiko nenpyδ. . .， 1， p.401-404. 
(71) Kagesa， op. cit.， p.365f. 
(72) Boyle， op. cit.， p.365f. 
(73) lnterview with Shoichi Matsuzaki， editor of the Showa shi no tennd series (The 
Emperor in the Showa Era) ， 30 vols.， Tokyo 1967-1976. This series was 
original1y printed in the newspaper Yomiuri Shinbun. It is a monumental 
achievement as a series of the oral history of the Showa era up to 1945. 
(74) Shin-ichi Arai，‘Nomonhan jiken' (The Nomonhan lncident)， in:Rekishigaku 
kenkyu kai (Historical Research Society) (edふTaiheiyδsensδshi(History of 
the Paceific War)， vol.3， Tokyo 1972， p.241.; Hiroshi Yoshii， Shδwagaikoshi 
(Diplomatic History ofthe Showa Era)， revised edition， Tokyo 1975， p.78. On 
the local war of Chunkufeng se: Alvin D. Coox， The Anatomy of a SmaU 
War. The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for Chungkufeng/Khasan， 1938， London 
1977. Cf. Kindermann， op. cit.， p.404. 
(75) Yoshii， op. cit.， p.79. 
(76) Tsunoda， Gendai shi shiryo， vo1. 10， p.74f.; Arai， op. cit.， p.244. 
(77) Yoshii， op. cit.， p.83. 
(78) Masao lnaba， Tatsuo Kobayashi， Toshihiko Shimada and Jun Tsunoda (eds.)， 
Taiheiyo sensδe no michi. Bekkαn shiryd hen (Special Volume of Source 
Material to TSM)， Tokyo 1963， p.322. Chihiro Hosoya，‘Sangoku dδmei to 
Nisso churitsu joyaku 1939nen-1941nen'， in: TSM， vo1. 5， 1963， p.184.; 
Chihiro Hosoya， 'The Tripartite Pact 1939-1940'， in:Morley (edよDeterrent
Diplomacy . . ， p. 218f. 
(79) lnaba et al.， op. cit.， p.323. On the War of Nomonhan， see vols. 25-29 of 
Shδwa shi no tenno as the most exhaustive oral history. Unfortunately there 
has not yet been a penetrating study of the effects the defeat in Nomonhan had 
on the political decisions of the Japanese military. The tasks thus stil1 remains 
to examine the causal relationship between this war and the resolution of the 
conference of 27 July 1940. Cf. further， Alvin D. Coox， Nomonhan， Japan 
against Russia， 1939， Stanford， Ca.， 1985. 
(80) Cf. Bernd Martin，‘Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen wahrend des Dritten 
Reiches'， in: Manfred Funke (ed.)， Hitler， Deutschland und die Machte， 
Dusseldorf 1976， pp. 294-296. 
(81) Evening edition of the newspaper Tokyo Asahi Shinbun of 29 August 19 
-29ー
(85) Ibid.， pp. 187-192. 
(86) On the failure of the new orientation of Abe's cabinet， see also: Bernd Martin， 
‘Japans WeItmachtstreben 1939-1941'， in:Oswald Hauser (ed.)， Weltpolitik 
II， 1939-1945， Gottingen 1975， p.112f. Cf. Kindermann， op. cit.， p.406f. 
(87) Akira Hara，‘Senji tosei keizai no kaishi' (The Beginnings of the War 
Economy)， in:Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi， vol. 20， p.227f. 
(88) Ibid.， p.230. 
(89) Ibid.， p.235. 
(90) Ibid. Cf. Kδichi Emi， Government Fiscal Activity and Economic Growth in 
Japan 1868.幽幽-1
(91り) Ha訂ra丸，op. citム.， p. 240. 
(92) Toshio Mano， Ludendorff no kokka soryoku sen (Ludendorf's Total War)， 
Tokyo 1939 (revised manuscript of the radio series of 26 November to 1 
December 1939). Mano studied in Vienna from 1926 to 1927. At the time of the 
broadcasting he was a member of the GeneraI Staf. He also pubIished a 
Japanese translation of Ludendorf's book Der totale Krieg (Tokyo 1938). 
(93) Mano， op. cit.， pp. 82-85. 
(94) Cf. Hans-Ulrich Wehler，‘Der VerfalI der deutschen Kriegstheorie: Vom“ab回
soluten" zum“totalen" Krieg oder von Clausewitz zu Ludendorff'， in: 
Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871-1918， Gottingen 1970， pp. 85-112.; Masaki 
Miyake，‘Doitsu daini teisei ki ni okeru gaiko to gunbu: HiIlgruber no shincho 
o chushin to shite' (The Diplomacy and the Military in the Second German Em幽
pire 1871-1918: Referring to the Recent Study by Professor Andreas 
HiIlgruber: Deutsche Grosmacht・und Wel伊olitikim 19. und 20. Jahrhundert， 
Dusseldorf 1977)， in:Meiji-Daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo kiyo (Memoirs 
of the Institute of Social Sciences， Meiji University)， vol. 20.; Masaki Miyake， 
'Theories of Civil-Military Relations as related to Japan and a Comparison 
with Germany's Case'， in:Seikei Ronsδ(The Review of Economics & PoIitical 
Science)， Vol. 59， No. 12， August 1990， pubIished by the Economic and 
PoIitical Institute of Meiji University， Tokyo. 
(95) Eberhard Jackel，‘Probleme einer Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges'， in: 
Gaikδ-Jihδ(Diplomatic Review)， No. 1027， April1966， p.110. 
(96) Shinkichi Etδ， Higashi ajia seiji shi kenkyu (Studies on the Political History of 
East Asia)， Tokyo 1968， Chapter 6， Taika wahei kosaku shi (History of the 
Peace Negotiations with China during the Sino-Japanese War). 
(97) Concerning Soviet help offered to Chiang Kai-shek's government， see note 33 
of this chapter. 
(98) A. Whitney Griswold， The Far Eastern Policy 01 the Un 
-30ー
(102) Wang's radio address is quoted in: Horiba， op. cit.， pp. 273-278. lriye points 
out that Clarence E. Gauss， the U.S. ambassador in Chungking， felt that 
Chiang Kai-shek was holding back from a military involvement after the 
Pacific War broke out， apparently believing that the burden of the war would 
fal on the shoulders of the Americans (Iriye， Nichi-Bei sensδ， p.73). 
(103) Eto， op. cit.， p.267f. Cf. Gerald E. Bunker， The Peace Conspiracy. Wang 
Ching-wei and the China WarJ 1937-1941， Cambridge， Mass.， 1972， pp. 21lf. 
-31ー
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This paper is a revised English version of my German article which was 
published as: Masaki Miyake，‘Die Lage J apans beim Ausbruch des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges'， in:Sommer 1939: Die Gro.ρmachte und der Europaische Krieg， 
Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Benz und Hermann Graml (Schriftenreihe der 
Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer)， Deutsche Verlags-
Ansta1t， Stuttgart 1979. 
1 would like to express my deep gratitude to the article's original editors， 
who gave me the permission to publish this English version， and to the article's 
original pu blisher. 
-32ー
